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People are generally too trusting, which decreases their ability to detect deceit. This
suggests that distrust could enhance our deception detection abilities. Yet, a state of
distrust may induce deliberative conscious thought. This mode of thinking has been
related to worse complex decision making. Hence, we investigate whether contextual
distrust decreases the ability to detect deceit via the stronger reliance on consciously
held beliefs about which cues betray deception. In two studies, participants were
asked to judge videos of either deceiving or truth telling targets. Contextual distrust
was manipulated by asking participants to squint their eyes (distrust) or to round
their eyes (trust) while watching the videos. Participants’ judgments of targets being
deceptive or truthful were measured (Studies 1 and 2) and they were asked on what
basis they made these judgments (Study 2). Results showed that distrust especially
hampers the detection of truth, which is partly due to more reliance on false beliefs
about deception cues. These results corroborate the idea that deliberative conscious
information processing may hinder truth detection, while intuitive information processing
may facilitate it.
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INTRODUCTION
The ability to detect deceit is an important skill in everyday life. Studies investigating deception
in everyday life, however, show that the majority of deceits are not discovered (DePaulo et al.,
1996; Vrij, 2000). When, in laboratory studies, people are explicitly asked whether a person is
deceiving or not, the unaided accuracy rate of detecting deception is not far above chance level
(e.g., see meta-analyses of Bond and DePaulo, 2006; Hartwig and Bond, 2011). This rate can be
increased, among others, with situational familiarity and contextual information (Blair et al., 2010;
Reinhard et al., 2013b).
One of the assumed reasons for the relatively poor unaided detection rate is that people
have the tendency to believe— rather than disbelieve— information that is being presented (i.e.,
the “truth bias” or ‘truth-default,” McCornack and Parks, 1986; O’Sullivan, 2003; Levine, 2014).
As a result, they often (mis)take a lie for truth. The Truth-Default Theory posits that as most
communication is honest most of the time, the benefits of believing outweigh the costs of occasional
deception (Levine, 2014; Clare and Levine, 2019). Consequently, people can detect truths with
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greater accuracy than lies (the veracity effect; e.g., Levine et al.,
1999). If too much trust stands in the way of deception
detection, wouldn’t being distrusted be the antidote for such
gullibility? In the current article, we investigate peoples’ ability
to detect deception under conditions of induced trust and
distrust. As a trusting motivational state may induce intuitive
information processing and a distrusting motivational state may
induce deliberative conscious information processing, our article
contributes to the debate on the existence of (un)conscious
deception detection.
Suspicion, Distrust and Deception
Detection
Research consistently showed that increasing suspicion decreases
truth-bias (McCornack and Levine, 1990; Stiff et al., 1992; Millar
and Millar, 1997; Hubbell et al., 2001). Studies on the effects of
suspicion on deception detection accuracy, however, show mixed
results. First, research is inconsistent about whether there is a
relationship between suspicion and detection accuracy. Several
studies showed little or no effect of suspicion on detection
accuracy (Toris and DePaulo, 1985; Buller et al., 1991; Stiff et al.,
1992), whereas other studies do show an effect (Zuckerman et al.,
1982; McCornack and Levine, 1990; Burgoon et al., 1994; Levine
et al., 1999; Millar and Millar, 1997; Kim and Levine, 2011).
Second, if a relationship between suspicion and detecting
deception is observed, the results are inconsistent. On the one
hand, Zuckerman et al. (1982) observed that more suspicious
participants were less accurate at decoding affect. The results of
Burgoon et al. (1994) showed that suspicious experts, but not
novices, were less accurate in detecting deception. On the other
hand, Levine et al. (1999) observed that suspicion increased lie
detection accuracy, but observed a curvilinear relationship for
truth accuracy that moderate levels of suspicion results in the
greatest accuracy. Finally, the results of Millar and Millar (1997)
and also of Kim and Levine (2011) showed that the effect of
suspicion on detecting deception depended on whether truths
or lies were judged. Suspicion decreased truth accuracy, while
increasing lie accuracy. This moderation may also explain why
studies not making a distinction between lies and truths did not
obtain effects. In sum, although the research on suspicion and
detection deception show mixed results, it seems to be the case
that suspicion often decreases truth detection accuracy, while
increasing lie detection accuracy.
Only a few studies on detecting deception focused on
the effects of distrust instead of suspicion. The two concepts
seem strongly related, but are distinct (Sinaceur, 2010).
In a state of suspicion, perceivers are uncertain about
another’s motives, whereas in a state of distrust, perceivers
have negative expectations about these motives. As a result,
suspicious perceivers are more willing to seek information in
order to determine whether another’s motives are honest or
not than distrusting perceivers (Sinaceur, 2010). So whereas
suspicion influences information seeking among perceivers,
distrust influences perceiver’s need to deal with a possibly
threatening situation. This may affect their deception detection
abilities differently.
Carter and Weber (2010) investigated the connection between
(dis)trust and the detections of truths and deceits. In their study,
they investigated individual differences in dispositional trust.
In doing so, they followed up on Yamagishi’s (2001) argument
that some people are in general less trusting than others, and
that those who tend to distrust others in life (‘low trusters’)
forego learning opportunities for deception detection. Because
low trusters are less likely to expose themselves to situations
in which they can be deceived, they simply are less likely to
learn how to recognize deceit. The results obtained by Carter
and Weber (2010) indeed were consistent with this reasoning.
In their study, participants were shown eight videos of simulated
job interviews of which half were completely truthful and half
included a variety of lies. The results showed that participants
who were dispositionally more trusting were better at detecting
deceit than dispositionally distrusting participants.
The Carter and Weber (2010) study provides first evidence
that distrust does not necessarily lead to more accuracy in
detecting deceit. Note that the main explanation for the
dispositional effects of distrust concentrate on the low truster’s
avoidance of learning experiences in the past. In addition to
these dispositional differences on trust, people also differ across
situations in the extent to which they are trusting (Schlenker et al.,
1973). So regardless people’s dispositional trust levels, people may
be more or less trusting depending on the specific situation and
the individuals they encounter in these situations. We argue that
this contextual distrust influences the detecting of deception as
well, but via a different process: the deliberative processing of the
presented information.
Intuitive vs. Deliberative Information
Processing
According to Schul et al. (2008) trust is default and connotes
being safe. Distrust signals that the environment is not normal
and, as a result, people avoid routine strategies and more carefully
scrutinize people’s behavior (see also Mayo, 2015). Signals
that a situation is (potentially) threatening foster deliberate
conscious processing, whereas signals that a situation is safe
foster less effortful processing (e.g., Schwarz, 1990). This line of
reasoning was also followed by Posten and Mussweiler (2013)
who contained that distrust may induce non-routine information
processing, which in their study led to less reliance on stereotypes
(see Conway et al., 2018 for a similar line of reasoning in the
domain of morality judgments). And more recently, Thommes
and Uitdewilligen (2019) argued and showed in a context of
team performance that low trust increased people’s motivation to
process task information more elaborately.
Taken together, these insights suggest that a distrusting
motivational state promotes deliberative conscious information
processing, whereas a trusting motivational state promotes
intuitive information processing. Deliberative information
processing (i.e., conscious thought) can be defined as controlled
and effortful object- or task-relevant cognitive and/or affective
thought processes, whereas intuitive information processing can
be defined as spontaneous cognitive and/or affective thought
processes without intentional effort (e.g., Petty and Cacioppo,
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1986; Kahneman, 2003; Strack and Deutsch, 2004). Intuitive
decision making may benefit from unconscious thought, defined
as thought processes occurring while one’s attention is directed
elsewhere to distract from conscious goal-directed deliberation
(e.g., Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006). Intuitive decision-
making includes both immediate and automatic decisions as well
as unconscious thought decisions. Decisions for both forms rely
on spontaneous thought processes without intentional effort.
The difference between these two forms is that for unconscious
thought decisions, the attention is directed elsewhere before
making the decision, whereas for automatic decisions, the
decision is immediate.
According to Unconscious Thought Theory (Dijksterhuis
and Nordgren, 2006), the modes of thinking (deliberative
vs. intuitive) differ in their characteristics, which makes each
mode preferable in different contexts. First, the conscious mind
has difficulties processing large amounts of information. Our
conscious capacity is limited: it can temporarily store about
7 items (Miller, 1956). As people consciously can only focus on
a limited number of attributes, this goes at the expense of other
(relevant) attributes (Wilson and Schooler, 1991). Unconscious
thought is assumed to have more processing capacity (e.g.,
Dijksterhuis, 2004). For instance, Dijksterhuis (2004) showed that
unconscious thought leads to better organization and clustering
of information in memory. In addition to differences in the
amount of information that can be processed, another difference
between the two modes of thinking is that conscious thought—
compared with unconscious thought—has more difficulties
weighing information cues. This is because conscious thought
relies more on top-down processing routines, such as rules of
thumb and stereotypes (e.g., Bos and Dijksterhuis, 2011). Also,
conscious decision-making is affected by contextual influences
and consciously held false beliefs (e.g., Reinhard et al., 2013a).
Because of these differences in characteristics, complex decisions
may be made better without than with conscious thought.
Ample studies on consumer decisions, impression formation,
attitude formation, and creativity have indeed demonstrated
that complex decisions made with unconscious thought are
better than complex decisions made with conscious thought
(also termed Unconscious Thought Effect, UTE; for an overview
see Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006). However, there are also
studies showing that unconscious thought does not (always)
lead to better complex decisions (e.g., Acker, 2008; Payne et al.,
2008; Calvillo and Penaloza, 2009; Lassiter et al., 2009; Newell
et al., 2009; Rey et al., 2009; Thorsteinson and Withrow, 2009;
Waroquier et al., 2009, 2010). A meta-analysis including all
available published and unpublished data on UTE (Strick et al.,
2011) provides support for the validity of UTE, but also identifies
boundary conditions and moderators of the effect (e.g., type of
distraction task, global vs. specific goal, presentation format).
A more recent meta-analysis of Nieuwenstein et al. (2015),
however, suggest that such a moderator account of the UTE does
not fit their meta-analysis and a large scale replication. Their
results seem to point to a publication bias. After correcting for
this, the UTE allegedly turned non-significant. Also, the meta-
analysis showed that previous UTE studies were underpowered.
A meta-analysis of Vadillo et al. (2015) using Bayes factor
analysis, however, showed that it is not a lack of power, but that
most experimental conditions support the null hypothesis.
(Un)conscious Thought and Deception
Detection
Recent findings suggest that conscious processes can hinder the
ability to detect deception (e.g., Reinhard et al., 2013a; Street and
Vadillo, 2016). Judging whether a person is truthful or deceptive
can be regarded as a complex decision. First, assessing cues,
such as level of detail and plausibility, is cognitively demanding
(e.g., Forrest and Feldman, 2000). Secondly, processing verbal
content as well as non-verbal information and attending to
a variety of different types of cues that may be observed, is
cognitively demanding as well (e.g., Reinhard and Sporer, 2008).
As judging whether a person is deceptive is a demanding process,
the Unconscious Thought Theory suggests deception detection
can be handled better without conscious thought.
In addition, when judgments of (dis)honesty are made
consciously, they may be based on incorrect beliefs about what
cues may signal deception (Reinhard et al., 2013a). It should
be noted that while correct beliefs increase the ability to detect
deception under conditions of distrust (Forrest et al., 2004), lay
people often mention wrong cues they rely on. Most people
believe that liars show more smiling, gaze aversion, eye blinking,
illustrators (i.e., gestures supporting speech), and a more active
body, but in reality liars and truth tellers do not differ in these
respects (Ekman, 1989; Vrij, 2000; Mann et al., 2002; DePaulo
et al., 2003; Sporer and Schwandt, 2007; Hartwig and Bond, 2011).
For the present purpose, we refer to these non-verbal cues with
the term ‘false deception indicators.’ Although in reality cues of
deception are subtle (Hartwig and Bond, 2011; Levine, 2019b),
cues that are diagnostic of deception are fewer hand movements,
appearing more nervous and having to think hard, being less
plausible and less logically consistent, having a higher pitch of
voice and using fewer details in a story (Vrij, 2000; DePaulo et al.,
2003; Sporer and Schwandt, 2007; Hartwig and Bond, 2011). Note
that these diagnostic indicators may be influenced by publication
bias (Luke, 2019).
Research indicative that unconscious deception detection may
outperform conscious thought showed that indirect measures
for deception detection (e.g., “Does the person have to think
hard?”) are more accurate than direct measures (“Do you think
the person is lying?”; e.g., DePaulo et al., 1997; Vrij et al., 2001;
Ten Brinke et al., 2014). The claims that indirect measures
outperform direct measures, however, are sometimes based on
incomparable metrics (Levine and Bond, 2014; Franz and von
Luxburg, 2015; Street and Vadillo, 2016; Levine, 2019b). Meta-
analysis showed that most indirect measures do not outperform
direct measures (Bond et al., 2014). According to Street and
Vadillo (2016), the indirect measures, which do outperform
direct measures, may draw attention to the correct indicators of
lying. As such, the differential findings for direct versus indirect
detection deception methods can be explained without needing
unconscious processes.
Indirect evidence that conscious thought can be very
successful as well, comes from recent studies that successfully
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improved the detection of deception with mindful and deliberate
strategies, such as inducing situational familiarity, strategic
questioning, and strategic use of evidence (for reviews see Levine,
2015, 2019a). This does not imply, however, that unconsciously
thinking about the obtained information may not further
increase the detection of deception. The information processed
consciously as well as unconsciously may trigger people to
abandon the default truth-response (for more information about
the triggers, see Levine, 2014).
Research directly investigating (un)conscious thought showed
that peoples’ ability to detect deception increased when they
were kept from consciously deliberating about the presented
information (Reinhard et al., 2013a). This increase can be
explained by a better integration of diagnostic information:
When deciding about the veracity of the presented information,
participants relied on more information cues in an unconscious
mode of thinking compared to conscious thought. Also, the cues
were more diagnostic of deception. This is in line with research of
Vrij et al. (2001) showing that observers rely more on incorrect
indicators when they are actively trying to assess whether
someone is lying. The findings of Reinhard et al. (2013a) were,
however, not reproduced by a high-powered replication study
(Moi and Shanks, 2015). As the original UTE, the unconscious
deception detection effects may be bound to certain conditions
and moderated by several factors (see also Levine, 2019b).
As the evidence for UTE and (un)conscious deception
detection is mixed, researchers agree that more research is
necessary (e.g., Vadillo et al., 2015; Street and Vadillo, 2016).
If (un)conscious thought effects for deception detection exist,
the following hypothesis can be formulated with regard to
(dis)trust: observers are less accurate in judging whether
someone is deceiving or telling the truth under conditions of
contextual distrust than under conditions of contextual trust.
More specifically, as distrust may induce conscious thought and
conscious thought leads to worse deception detection abilities, it
is expected that truth tellers will be judged as more deceptive than
liars. As trust may elicit intuitive processes, but not necessarily
unconscious thought, it is expected that liars and truth tellers
will not be distinguished under conditions of trust. So, in
our studies we do not test effects of unconscious thought,
but compare deception detection abilities when processing
information deliberatively versus intuitively.
To test our hypothesis, (dis)trust was varied using a disguised
manipulation by having observers adopt facial expressions in line
with either distrust –squinted eyes– or trust –wide open eyes. We
used this manipulation because previous research and theorizing
has demonstrated that squinted eyes are associated with distrust
and wide eyes with trust (Zebrowitz, 1997; Schul et al., 2004; Lee
and Anderson, 2017). Lee and Anderson, for example, argued
that the eyes communicate complex mental states and showed
that people associate narrowed eyes with a suspicious mindset.
In their discussion, they speculated that these findings could also
extend to the persons expressing these eye expressions, which
would mean that narrowing the eyes would activate distrust and
rounding them would activate trust. Such an account would fit
with embodiment theory (Niedenthal, 2007). In agreement with
this notion, participants in the current studies were instructed to
adopt either such squinted or rounded eye positions (henceforth
indicated as eye instructions) while watching video fragments
of liars and truth-tellers. Then, they judged the extent to which
they thought the person on the video was telling the truth or
lying and indicated on which cues they based their judgment. The




This study was carried out in accordance with the American
Psychological Association guidelines and was approved by the
Ethics Committee of the University of Twente in Enschede, the
Netherlands (BCE16176). We report all data exclusions (if any),
all manipulations, and all measures in the study. Sample size
was a result of terminating data collection after 3 weeks (as was
decided beforehand). All subjects gave written informed consent
in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Participants and Design
Ninety-three students from University of Twente (62 women
and 31 men; Mage = 25.23, SDage = 9.29; age range 18–
54 years) participated for course credit points. They were
randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (context: distrust
vs. trust) × 2 (target: liar vs. truth-teller) factorial design with
context as between participants variable and target as within
participants variable.
Procedure
Participants watched eight video fragments displaying a target
person who was either lying or telling the truth (see section
“Materials”). Before watching the fragment, participants were
given eye instructions to manipulate (dis)trust, which they
carried out while they watched the video fragment. To disguise
the purpose of the manipulation, participants were told that
we were interested in the effect of an extra task (the eye
instructions) when watching others. One group of participants
received instructions to narrow their eyes while watching the
fragment, another group to round their eyes. During the study,
the experimenter was present to check whether all participants
carried out the eye instructions. All participants did so.
The eye instructions are based on Schul et al. (2004) who used
facial stimuli with narrowed and rounded eyes to manipulate
distrusting and trusting facial expressions (see also Zebrowitz,
1997; Lee and Anderson, 2017). As considering other people’s
faces with narrowed eyes as untrustworthy is not the same as
the proposition that narrowing one’s own eyes would induce
oneself to become less trusting, we pre-tested our instructions in a
pilot study (N = 24). Participants carried out the eye instructions
described above while judging seven pictures displaying different
persons. After each picture, they indicated to what extent they felt
that the person could be trusted on a 7-points scale (1 = not at all;
7 = very much). This pilot study demonstrated that narrowing the
1https://osf.io/5xyts/
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eyes led participants to trust people less (M = 3.90; SD = 1.15)
than rounding the eyes (M = 4.64, SD = 0.41), F(1,22) = 4.75,
p = 0.04, η 2p = 0.18.
After each video fragment, we measured participants’
deception judgments by asking them on two separate 7-point
scales (1 = not at all; 7 = very much) to what extent they thought
the person was telling the truth or was lying (as in Stel and Van
Dijk, 2018, Study 2). We measured these deception judgments on
a 7-point scale because such measurements may be more sensitive
than dichotomous measurements, and because we reasoned that
deception judgments such as these are not binary in nature.
It should be noted, however, that prior research suggests that
the type of measurement generally does not affect deception
detection results (Levine et al., 2010).
For exploratory purposes, trust for the person on the video and
dispositional distrust were also measured. Trust for the person on
the video was measured by asking participants on a 7-point scale
(1 = not at all, 7 = completely) whether they trusted the person on
the video. Cronbach’s alpha for the lie videos was 0.38 and for the
truth videos 0.59.
Dispositional trust was measured using the General Trust
Scale (Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994). This questionnaire
consists of six items. Three of these items are related to the
“belief that [others are] benevolent [persons]” and the other
three are related to the “belief that caution is needed in dealing
with others.” The items could be answered on a scale from
1 to 5, with 1 implying the lowest level of agreement, and 5
implying the highest level of agreement. Cronbach’s alpha was
0.60. Because of these unacceptable low alpha’s, trust for the
person and dispositional trust were not further analyzed2.
Finally, participants reported their gender, age, and
nationality. At the end, participants were thanked and debriefed.
Materials
The videos were developed using a high stakes mock crime
paradigm and were produced by Ten Brinke et al. (2014). Targets
on the video were instructed to either steal or not steal $100
dollar from an envelope placed between books in the experiment
room. They were instructed to convince the experimenter they
had not stolen the money (regardless of whether they actually
stole the money). The experimenter interrogated the suspects
by asking a series of questions, starting with baseline questions
(e.g., “What are you wearing today?” and “How is the weather
like outside today?”) followed by pleading questions (“Did you
steal the money?”, “Why should I believe you?” and “Are you
lying to me now?”. The videos were about one and a half
minutes long. The eight videos displayed truth and lies, as well
as targets’ gender equally.
Results and Discussion
The measurements of the questions regarding telling the truth
and lying were averaged to constitute a ‘deception judgment’
2Moreover, the measure of trust for the person of the video seem conflated. Given
our setup, in which the question to what extent they trust the person on the
video was asked after the veracity judgment, the measurement was probably more
indicative of whether participants felt the person was speaking the truth than of
general distrust.
score, after reversing the truth-question, because of their highly
correlation (0.89). Deception judgments of truthful and lying
targets were normally distributed (skewness scores liars = 0.03;
truth tellers = 0.17).
To investigate our contextual distrust hypothesis that
observers are less accurate in judging whether someone is
deceiving or telling the truth under conditions of contextual
distrust than under conditions of contextual trust, a 2 (context:
distrust vs. trust) × 2 (target: liar vs. truth-teller) repeated
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with context as
independent variable and with deception judgment of liars
and truth tellers as within participants dependent variable was
conducted. Table 1 presents means and contrast tests. The
analysis yielded the hypothesized interaction between context
and target, F(1,91) = 46.91, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.34. When distrust
was activated, participants inaccurately judged truth-tellers as
more deceitful (M = 4.15, SD = 1.12) than liars (M = 3.27,
SD = 0.86), p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.89. When trust was activated,
participants accurately judged liars (M = 4.22, SD = 0.88) as more
deceitful than truth-tellers (M = 3.27, SD = 0.92), p < 0.001,
Cohen’s d = 1.07. Also, participants judged truth tellers as more
deceitful in the distrust than in the trust condition, p < 0.001,
Cohen’s d = 0.87; whereas participants judged liars as more
deceitful in the trust than in the distrust condition, p < 0.001,
Cohen’s d = 1.10. There were no main effects of context or
target, Fs < 1.
STUDY 2
The findings of Study 1 showed that induced distrust led
participants to inaccurately judge truth tellers to be more
deceptive than liars, whereas induced trust led participants to
accurately judge liars to be more deceptive than truth tellers.
In Study 2, we investigated this effect using different videos.
Also, we included a control condition to examine whether
distrust hampers the ability to detect deception and/or trust
facilitates this.
A second aim of this study was to investigate whether the
reliance on the use of false and correct indicators of deception
and truth played a role in the effect of (dis)trust on detecting
deception. Previous research showed that conscious thought
leads people to rely (1) more on false deception indicators (e.g.,
TABLE 1 | Means and standard deviations of participants’ judgments of the
targets’ deception, as a function of context and target for Study 1 (the higher the
scores, the more deceitful, 1 = totally not deceitful, 7 = very much deceitful).
Context Target
Liar Truth teller
M SD M SD
Distrust 3.27a 0.86 4.15b 1.12
Trust 4.22c 0.88 3.27d 0.92
Means with non-common subscripts differ significantly (p < 0.05) within each
column and row.
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Vrij et al., 2001) and (2) less on diagnostic cues (Reinhard et al.,
2013a). As distrust elicits conscious thought, it is expected that
observers in a distrusting state rely more on false indicators of
lying and less on diagnostic indicators when judging deception
regardless whether targets are deceiving or honest compared
to people in a trusting state. We investigate whether reliance
on these deception indicators (partly) mediates the effect of
contextual (dis)trust on detecting deception.
Finally, to exclude possible alternative explanations of our
results due to the used contextual (dis)trust manipulation, we




Fifty-four students from Leiden University (30 women, 24 men;
Mage = 20.17, SDage = 2.69; rangeage: 17–28 years) participated
for payment (€2). They were randomly assigned to one of the
conditions of a 3 (context: distrust vs. trust vs. control) × 2
(target: liar vs. truth-teller) factorial design.
Procedure
The procedure of Study 2 is similar to that of Study 1, except
that participants now watched one of four video fragments
displaying a target person who was either lying or telling the
truth. To investigate whether the effect is generalizable to other
videos, we used different videos in the current study (see section
“Materials”). As in Study 1, eye instructions while participants
watched the video fragment manipulated (dis)trust. In addition
to a trust and distrust condition, we added a control condition in
which participants did not receive any eye instructions.
After measuring deception judgments (as in Study 1),
participants were asked how certain they were of their judgments
for exploratory purposes. For exploratory purposes, participants
were asked how confident they were of their deception and truth
judgments on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all; 7 = very much).
Then, participants answered an open-ended question on
what basis they made their deception and truth judgments.
Participants’ responses on the question why they thought the
target was lying or telling the truth were rated by counting
false and correct indicators of lying. Based on the meta-analyses
of DePaulo et al. (2003), Sporer and Schwandt (2007), and
Hartwig and Bond (2011) indicators were classified as false
when participants relied on cues that are unreliable indicators
of deception or the truth. These are: gaze aversion, eye blinking,
smiling, illustrators, movements of the body, posture, and
appearance. This also includes incorrectly believing that more
hand movements are indicative of lying. Indicators were classified
as correct when it was correctly mentioned that the above listed
false indicators are indeed non-diagnostic of deception and that
fewer hand movements, appearing more nervous, and having
to think hard were diagnostic. As these correct beliefs about
truth and deception include correct beliefs about non-diagnostic
cues as well, we also calculated the number of diagnostic cues
separately (i.e., fewer hand movements, appearing more nervous,
and having to think hard). The diagnostic cues ‘being less
plausible,’ ‘being less logically consistent,’ ‘having a higher pitch
of voice,’ and ‘using fewer details in a story’ (DePaulo et al.,
2003) were not included as the videos used in Study 2 focused
on non-verbal cues only.
Finally, to control for possible unintended effects of the
instructions, we included three measures. First, participants’
mood was measured by asking them to rate how tense,
enthusiastic, pleased, worried, irritated, angry, confused, cheerful,
dreary, happy, and sad they felt. Second, participants rated the
difficulty of carrying out the instructions. All questions were
answered on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all; 7 = very much).
Third, in an open-ended question about the intended goal of the
study none of the participants mentioned a link between the eye
instructions and deception detection. Trust judgments for the
person on the video and dispositional trust were not included as
measures in this study.
Materials
The fragments were obtained when unobtrusively recording
target persons’ body and face while they lied or told the truth
to another student about a film fragment which only the target
persons had seen (similar to Stel and Van Dijk, 2018). The target
persons believed that the other student was instructed to find
out whether they lied or told the truth and it was their job to
convince the other student that they were telling the truth. To
raise the stakes, we told that the ability to convince others would
be relevant to their career as a psychologist and would predict
future success. The first minute of each target’s presentation was
selected. Afterward, the target persons were debriefed about the
real purpose of the study and were asked for permission to use the
recorded material. The videos did not display sound as these were
made with the purpose to investigate non-verbal behaviors only.
Results and Discussion
Deception Judgment
As in Study 1, the two deception items were averaged to a
deception judgment score, after reversing the scores for the truth-
item (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.79). Deception judgments of truthful
and lying targets were normally distributed (skewness scores
liars = 0.33; truth tellers = 0.28).
To investigate the contextual distrust hypothesis that
observers are less accurate in judging deception under conditions
of contextual distrust than under conditions of contextual trust,
a 3 (context: distrust vs. trust vs. control) × 2 (target: liar vs.
truth teller) ANOVA with context as independent variable and
participants’ deception judgment of the target as a dependent
variable was conducted. Table 2 presents means and contrast
tests. A main effect of context, F(2,48) = 5.21, p = 0.01, η2p = 0.18,
indicated that participants rated the target as less deceptive when
trust was induced (M = 2.97, SD = 1.14) than when distrust was
induced (M = 4.25, SD = 1.52), p = 0.003, Cohen’s d = −0.99, and
than participants in the control condition (M = 3.76, SD = 1.25),
p = 0.05, Cohen’s d = −0.68. The distrust and control condition
did not differ significantly, p = 0.22, Cohen’s d = 0.37.
A marginally significant main effect of target, F(1,48) = 3.13,
p = 0.08, η2p = 0.06, Cohen’s d = 0.40, showed that participants
tended to rate the truthful target as more deceptive (M = 3.90,
SD = 1.55) than the lying target (M = 3.40, SD = 1.19).
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TABLE 2 | Means and standard deviations of participants’ judgments of the
targets’ deception, as a function of context and target for Study 2 (the higher the
scores, the more deceitful, 1 = totally not deceitful, 7 = very much deceitful).
Context Target
Liar Truth teller
M SD M SD
Distrust 3.19a 1.00 5.31b 1.16
Trust 3.05a 1.42 2.89a 0.78
Control 3.86a 1.03 3.63a 1.58
Means with non-common subscripts differ significantly (p < 0.05) within each
column and row.
Both main effects were qualified by an interaction effect of
context and target, F(2,48) = 5.39, p = 0.01, η2p = 0.18. The truth
telling target was rated as more deceptive (M = 5.31, SD = 1.16)
than the lying target (M = 3.19, SD = 1.00) in the distrust
condition only, p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = 2.09, not in the trust
and the control condition, Fs < 1. Additionally, context only
affected judgment ratings for truth telling targets, p < 0.001, not
for lying targets, p = 0.29: Truth telling targets were rated as more
deceptive in the distrust condition (M = 5.31, SD = 1.16) than
in the trust condition (M = 2.89, SD = 0.78), p < 0.001, Cohen’s
d = 2.64, and than in the control condition (M = 3.63, SD = 1.58),
p = 0.01, Cohen’s d = 1.30. The trust and control condition did
not differ significantly, p = 0.22, Cohen’s d = −0.65.
Indicators of Deception
False indicators and the total number of indicators were normally
distributed (skewness scores false indicators = 0.10; total number
of indicators = 0.13). Correct beliefs (total) and diagnostic
cues were not normally distributed (skewness score = 0.74 and
0.72). Therefore, separate tests for false and total number of
indicators were conducted with ANOVA’s and for correct beliefs
and diagnostic cues with Kruskal–Wallis H tests.
False indicators
To test our indicator hypothesis that observers in a distrusting
state rely more on false indicators of lying when judging
deception regardless whether targets are deceiving or honest
compared to people in a trusting state, a 3 (context: distrust vs.
trust vs. control) × 2 (target: liar vs. truth teller) ANOVA on
the number of false indicators was conducted. Table 3 presents
means and contrast tests.
There was no main effect of target, F(1,48) = 1.75, p = 0.19,
η2p = 0.04, nor a main effect of context, F(2,48) = 1.60, p = 0.21,
η2p = 0.06. An interaction effect between context and target,
F(2,48) = 4.74, p = 0.01, η2p = 0.17, indicated that when targets told
the truth, participants mentioned more false indicators of lying
(M = 1.20, SD = 0.96) than when the target was lying (M = 0.93,
SD = 0.70) in the distrust condition only, p = 0.01, Cohen’s
d = 0.34; not in the trust and the control condition, Fs < 1.43,
ps > 0.16, Cohen’s d < 0.78.
Correct indicators
To investigate whether participants had more correct beliefs about
cues for liars and/or truth tellers depending on context, two
Kruskal–Wallis H tests were conducted for lying and truth telling
targets separately. These analyses showed that context did not
significantly influence correct indicators of deception for lying
targets χ(2)2 = 1.66, p = 0.44, nor for truth telling targets
χ(2)2 = 3.12, p = 0.21.
To investigate whether participants used more diagnostic
indicators for deception and the truth depending on context, two
Kruskal–Wallis H tests were conducted for lying and truth telling
targets separately. These analyses showed again that context did
not significantly influence correct indicators of deception for
lying targets χ(2)2 = 0.44, p = 0.80, nor for truth telling targets
χ(2)2 = 2.62, p = 0.27.
Total number of indicators
To test whether participants used more indicators in total for liars
and/or truth tellers depending on context, a 3 (context: distrust
vs. trust vs. control) × 2 (target: liar vs. truth teller) ANOVA
with total numbers of indicators was conducted. There were no
effects of context, target, or an interaction between the two, Fs < 1
(overall: M = 1.65, SD = 0.83).
Correlations and Mediation
The deception judgment was significantly correlated with the
number of false indicators of lying, r = 0.41, n = 54, p = 0.002, and
not with correct beliefs, r = −0.07, n = 54, p = 0.60, or diagnostic
indicators of lying, r = −0.06, n = 54, p = 0.67.
To test whether the effect of context and target on deception
judgments was indeed mediated by the reliance on false
indicators, we used the regression method proposed by Baron
TABLE 3 | Means and standard deviations of participants’ number of mentioned false, correct, and unrelated indicators of lying, as a function of context and target
for Study 2.
Indicators target context False Correct Diagnostic
Liar Truth teller Liar Truth teller Liar Truth teller
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Distrust 0.75a 0.71 1.75b 0.89 0.88a 0.64 0.25a 0.46 0.63a 0.52 0.25a 0.46
Trust 0.90a 0.74 1.33ab 0.71 0.70a 0.95 0.44a 0.53 0.60a 0.84 0.44a 0.53
Control 1.09ac 0.70 0.50c 0.93 0.45a 0.52 0.88a 0.83 0.45a 0.52 0.75a 0.71
Means with non-common subscripts differ significantly (p < 0.05) within each indicator.
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and Kenny (1986). The context dummy contrasts distrust versus
trust and no instruction. First, the interaction effect between
context and target on number of false indicators is significant,
B = −0.27, t = −2.22, p = 0.03. In a different regression model,
the interaction between context and target produced significant
effects on deception judgment, B = −0.59, t = −3.27, p = 0.002.
After inclusion of the mediator, this interaction effect remained
significant, B = −0.48, t = −2.61, p = 0.01. Moreover, the number
of false indicators significantly affected the deception judgment,
B = 0.43, t = 2.07, p = 0.04. These findings show that the use of
false indicators of lying partially mediated the effect of context
and target on deception judgments, Sobel: z = −2.07, p = 0.04.
Confidence in Deception Judgment
To explore whether context influenced participants’ confidence
in their deception judgment, a 3 (context: distrust vs. trust
vs. control) × 2 (target: liar vs. truth teller) ANOVA with
participants’ ratings of their certainty in judging deception was
conducted. The analysis showed no main or interaction effects,
Fs < 1.
Mood
The mood items were combined into the mean of the twelve
mood items, after reversing the negative items (Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.71). To test whether mood could alternatively explain
the results, a 3 (context: distrust vs. trust vs. control) × 2
(target: liar vs. truth teller) ANOVA with participants’ mood as
dependent variable was conducted. There was no main effect
of context, F(2,48) = 2.11, p = 0.13, η2p = 0.08, no main effect
of target, nor an interaction effect between context and target,
Fs < 1. If anything, the main effect of context showed the
pattern that participants in the control condition felt less positive
(M = 4.44, SD = 1.11) than participants distrust condition
(M = 4.87, SD = 0.57), p = 0.13. Cohen’s d = −0.49, or than
participants in trust condition (M = 4.96, SD = 0.62), p = 0.06.
Cohen’s d = −0.59. The distrust and trust condition did not differ
significantly in mood, p = 0.74. Cohen’s d = −0.16.
Difficulty in Carrying Out the Instructions
To test whether differences in difficulty of carrying out the
eye instructions could have influenced the results, a 3 (context:
distrust vs. trust vs. control) × 2 (target: liar vs. truth teller)
ANOVA with participants’ ratings of the difficulty of carrying
out the instructions as a dependent variable was conducted.
There was no main effect of target, F < 1, nor an interaction
effect between context and target, F(2,48) = 1.22, p = 0.31,
η2p = 0.05. A main effect of context, F(2,48) = 11.24, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.32, showed that participants in the control condition
rated the instructions as less difficult (M = 2.00, SD = 1.41) than
participants in the distrust condition (M = 4.37, SD = 1.36),
p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = −1.76, or than participants in the trust
condition (M = 4.05, SD = 2.09), p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = −1.18.
The distrust and trust condition did not significantly differ in
difficulty, p = 0.59, Cohen’s d = 0.18.
So importantly, the obtained results on detecting deception
and the reliance on false indicators cannot be explained by mood
or difficulty in carrying out the instructions.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Although it seems evident to expect that enhancing distrust
should reduce the truth-bias that people tend to believe others in
general, the results did not show that distrusting people were less
likely to (mis)take a lie for the truth. On the contrary, our findings
indicate that distrust led participants to hold truths for lies. More
specifically, the results of Studies 1 and 2 showed that contextual
distrust led participants to inaccurately judge truth tellers as more
deceptive than liars. Furthermore, the results of Study 2 showed
that people who were distrusting relied more on false beliefs
about lying when judging truth tellers than when judging liars.
Importantly, induced distrust did not lead participants to
conclude that all targets were deceitful. This is in line with the
notion that inducing contextual distrust may elicit a specific
mode of thinking: deliberative conscious information processing.
The finding that a distrusting state led participants to rely more
on their conscious but false beliefs about cues of deception would
fit such an account. Moreover, the finding that a conscious state of
mind hampers detecting deception and increases the use of more
incorrect indicators, is in line with the results of Vrij et al. (2001)
and Reinhard et al. (2013a). Although we did not directly test
the existence or benefits of unconscious deception judgments, we
add to this debate by showing that contextually induced modes of
thinking affect the ability to detect deception.
Detecting Deception
Previous research showed that dispositional distrust leads to
worse detection of deception allegedly due to lack of experience
with deceptive situations (Carter and Weber, 2010). The current
research adds that contextual distrust hampers the ability to
detect lies, via a different process: due to more reliance on
false beliefs about deception, distrusting observers are less able
to detect truths. The results imply that although people might
be generally trusting or distrusting, encountering a situation
which induces distrust leads them to rely more on false beliefs
of deception and to be less accurate in detecting truths. One
might argue that because dispositionally trusting individuals have
more experience with deceptive situations, they are less likely
to rely on these false beliefs about lying, and thus the effects
should be less strong. Previous research, however, showed that
experienced people (police officers) also hold these false beliefs
about deception (Vrij et al., 2001).
The main result that contextual distrust led participants to
inaccurately judge truth tellers as more deceptive than liars is due
to truth tellers being seen as more deceptive (when compared
to the control condition). Previous research on suspicion, even
though mixed, seems to suggest that suspicion decreases truth
detection accuracy and increases lie detection accuracy. Our
findings are partly in line by showing that distrust decreases
truth detection accuracy. That distrust did not increase lie
detection accuracy, whereas suspicion generally does, may reflect
differences in the concepts of distrust and suspicion (Sinaceur,
2010). When being suspicious, people will seek more information
regardless whether the person is lying or telling the truth. When
being distrusting, people already have negative expectations, this
is why distrust may not have increased lie detection accuracy. Our
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results showed that participants in the distrust condition relied
more on their conscious false beliefs about deception cues when
judging truth tellers.
Indicators of Deception
We found that reliance on false indicators decreased deception
detection, not that correct indicators increased this. It is not
in line with our expectations and with previous research that
reliance on diagnostic cues is unrelated to accuracy (e.g., Hartwig
and Bond, 2011). We do think, however, that our results are
valuable by showing that using diagnostic cues does not always
lead to better detection of deception. First, it is possible that
participants relied on other cues as well which they did not
report (see also Hartwig and Bond, 2011). Second, a moderating
factor may be the type of videos we used (non-verbal only).
Because we used videos focusing on non-verbal cues only, the
diagnostic cues participants could rely on were reduced. As
multiple cues increase diagnostic value (Hartwig and Bond,
2014), it is conceivable that the number of diagnostic cues
displayed moderates the effect of diagnostic cues on the ability
to detect deception. A meta-analysis on all data sets, including
those who also did not obtain a relationship between diagnostic
cues and detecting deception (see also Luke, 2019) may shed light
on possible moderators.
Importantly, we do show that reliance on false cues of
deception decreases the ability to detect deception. These
results are in line with Vrij et al. (2001) who showed that
participants who (partly) relied on non-diagnostic cues (in the
direct measurement condition) were worse at detecting deception
than participants who relied on diagnostic cues only (in the
indirect measurement condition). We did not expect, however,
that within the distrust condition the reliance on false indicators
would differ for liars and truth tellers. This result seems puzzling
as when participants would use uninformative cues only, they
would not respond differently to deceivers and truth tellers.
The category of false indicators, however, includes incorrectly
mentioning more hand movements for deceivers and fewer
hand movements for truth tellers, whereas in reality, fewer hand
movements are indicative of liars (Sporer and Schwandt, 2007;
Hartwig and Bond, 2011). This may explain why the use of these
false indicators of liars when judging truth tellers in the distrust
condition leads to worse deception judgments compared with
truth tellers in the trust and control condition.
This is related to the strategies used by deceivers and truth
tellers. Even though both liars and truth tellers would like to
appear credible, liars worry about giving away that they are
lying via non-verbal and verbal cues. As such, liars often try
to control their behavior (Hamlin et al., 2020). Truth tellers,
on the other hand, are nervous as well, but as they do not
have to worry about leaking cues of deception, they do not
control their movements. This may explain why liars show fewer
hand movements compared with truth tellers, opposite of what
observers may expect and, consequently, why we found that
making use of this incorrect cue of deception leads to worse
deception judgments when judging truth tellers compared with
liars. This effect only occurred when distrusting a source, as
observers more strongly relied on these false beliefs and, as a
result, take a truth for a lie. This way, being distrustful ironically
hampers one’s ability for accurate truth detection.
An important factor is that distrusting observers are liable
to use the wrong deception cues. However, the reliance
on these wrong cues only partially mediated the contextual
distrust results on detecting deception. In line with previous
arguments (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004; Reinhard et al., 2013a), we
suggest that the results may additionally reflect that distrusting
participants are less capable of organizing and integrating the
presented information as a distrusting state induces deliberative
information processing. It would be interesting to test this idea in
future research.
(Un)conscious Thought
The results that induced distrust led to worse deception
judgments compared with induced trust, fit with the notion of the
Unconscious Thought Theory that complex decisions are better
made without conscious thought. The finding that contextual
trust did not induce participants to use more correct indicators
does not directly support the idea that unconscious thought
leads to better complex decision-making (e.g., Dijksterhuis,
2004). Note, however, that our contextual trust condition is
assumed to elicit intuitive information processing, not to facilitate
unconscious thought specifically. Our participants were not given
much time to unconsciously think about the decision, and were
also not distracted in between the presentation of the information
and the judgment. Nevertheless, in Study 1 we did find that
induced trust led participants to accurately distinguish between
liars and truth tellers. These findings were not replicated in
Study 2, although truth-telling targets were rated more accurately
in the trust than in the distrust condition. So these results imply
that a context eliciting intuitive information processing without
unconscious thought does not lead people to rely on more or
on more correct use of indicators. Such a context, however, does
facilitate truth detection.
The differences in findings that trust leads to more accurate
deception detection in Study 1, but only partly (for truth tellers
only) in Study 2, may be due to the different videos we used in
Studies 1 and 2. In Study 1, we used videos in which liars may
be better detected due to the interrogative nature of the video
which started by asking all targets baseline questions on which
they answered truthfully. The assumption is that it is easier to
discover lying behavior of a person when people are familiar with
truthful behavior of this same person, due to a change in the
person’s non-verbal behavior (e.g., Vrij and Mann, 2001; Mann
et al., 2002; Porter and Ten Brinke, 2010). On the videos of
Study 2, liars displayed deceptive behavior only and non-verbal
behavior only, which makes it harder to detect the liars of Study 2
than of Study 1. The difference in the results of both studies
seems to suggest that, depending on the way the information
is presented or asked for, intuitive information processing may
facilitate detecting liars as well.
Limitations
A limitation of our research is that the sample size of Study 2
is low (N = 54). As such, the results should be interpreted with
caution. Importantly, our main finding that when distrust was
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activated, participants inaccurately judged truth-tellers as more
deceitful than liars was obtained with a larger sample in Study
1 (N = 93) in which target was a within subject variable. In
both studies, the obtained interaction effect of context and target
on the deception judgment had a large effect size (η2p of Study
1 = 0.34; η2p of Study 2 = 0.18; Cohen, 1988). Also the specific
finding within the distrust condition that participants judged
truth-tellers as more deceitful than liars had a large effect in both
studies (Cohen’s d of Study 1 = 0.89; Cohen’s d of Study 2 = 2.09).
The additional analyses on indicators of deception were, however,
only investigated in Study 2. These should be interpreted with
caution. Although the main interaction effect of context and
target on false indicators was a large effect (η2p = 0.17), the specific
comparison within the distrust condition that participants relied
more on false indicators of lying when judging truth-tellers
compared to liars had a small to medium effect size (Cohen’s
d = 0.34).
In our studies, we did not directly manipulate (un)conscious
thought. Our argument is that distrust induces deliberative
processing as distrust signals that a problematic situation
exists, which fosters deliberation (e.g., Schwarz, 1990). Previous
research also showed that distrust leads people to more
elaborately process information and more carefully scrutinize
people’s behavior, which reflects deliberation (e.g., Schul et al.,
2008; Posten and Mussweiler, 2013; Conway et al., 2018;
Thommes and Uitdewilligen, 2019). Nevertheless, future research
should test our proposed mechanism behind the effect, i.e., that
the effect is indeed caused by (dis)trusting states influencing
intuitive or deliberative thought.
Another limitation of our studies is that we induced contextual
(dis)trust by a subtle eyes-manipulation, not by situational
or environmental cues. Even though manipulating distrust via
the (social) environment would have created a more real life
situation, a subtle and unobtrusive manipulation unrelated to
the information presented as used in the present studies is less
prone to alternative interpretations of the results. While we do
not have any reason to expect that contextual distrust as elicited
in a specific (social) environment would not show similar effects,
it would be interesting to test this in future research.
CONCLUSION
We showed that contextual distrust hampers peoples’ ability
to detect deception especially for truth tellers, partly because
people rely more on their false beliefs about deception. Also,
depending on the way the information is presented, contextual
trust facilitates the detecting of deception. As a distrusting
motivational state fosters deliberative information processing
and a trusting motivational state fosters intuitive information
processing, these insights contribute to the debate on the
existence of (un)conscious deception detection: deliberative
conscious information processing hinders the ability to detect
deception, while intuitive information processing is beneficial,
at least when it comes to detecting the truth. Investigating
contexts that differ in modes of processing provides a new way of
investigating the existence of (un)conscious deception detection.
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